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THURBERT BAKER BEHAVING BADLY 
 
Published in slightly abridged form in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, p. 3B (June 17, 2007). 
 
Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. 
 
Genarlow Wilson’s 10-year sentence and continued imprisonment is widely 
recognized, both in this state and across the country, as a grave miscarriage of 
justice.  Last Monday, June 11, 2007, the  Monroe County Superior Court determined 
that Wilson’s punishment violated the state constitution and granted his habeas corpus 
petition, resentencing Wilson to 12 months and ordering his immediate release.  The 
decision was applauded everywhere.  The decent thing for Attorney General Thurbert 
Baker to do would have been to leave the decision undisturbed and allow Wilson to 
go free.  Instead, he appealed. 
 
Baker says only the Douglas County Superior Court, where Wilson was convicted, 
has authority to resentence Wilson.  Baker is flat wrong.  Habeas courts have always 
possessed broad, flexible powers to fashion appropriate relief.  The usual practice, 
when it invalidates a sentence, is for the habeas court to remand the petitioner to the 
convicting court for resentencing, but there is no Georgia statute prohibiting a habeas 
court from itself conducting the resentencing.  The relevant law, Ga. Code Ann. § 9-
14-48(d), codifies traditional practices by expansively providing that a habeas court 
granting relief “shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or 
sentence challenged in the proceeding, and such supplementary orders as to 
rearraignment, retrial, custody, or discharge as may be necessary and proper.”  There 
is not a single Georgia Supreme Court decision interpreting this statute to forbid 
habeas courts from resentencing successful petitioners.  O’Donnell v. Durham, 275 
Ga. 860, 573 S.E.2d 23 (2002),  which Baker claims bars habeas courts from 
resentencing petitioners, says no such thing. 
 
Baker’s responsibility to follow the laws as they are written in no way compelled him 
to appeal.  Baker was not legally required to appeal, even if he thought the habeas 
decision was erroneous; nor did he have an ethical duty to appeal.  Whether to take 
the appeal was entirely a matter of prosecutorial discretion, and occasionally 
prosecutors do decline appealing habeas decisions in favor of prisoners.  Considering 
all the circumstances, it is strange that Baker does not find Wilson’s habeas victory an 
appropriate occasion for exercising his discretion to decline to appeal–a discretion 
which also permits him to withdraw his appeal whenever he wishes.  Nothing could 
be further from the truth than Baker’s claim that he doesn’t have the luxury of picking 
which cases to defend–or, in this case, to appeal.  Of course he does. 
 
Baker’s “floodgates” argument is that failing to appeal in the Wilson case would open 
the door to other habeas petitioners claiming they are entitled to relief because Wilson 
prevailed.  But the Wilson habeas decision has absolutely no potential for affecting 
the sentences of any significant number of convicted felons.  There are at most around 
25 other state prison inmates in a situation even arguably similar to Wilson’s.   And a 
discretionary decision not to appeal in Wilson’s case would be irrelevant in the 
context of habeas petitions filed by inmates other than Wilson; this is what discretion 
means. 
 
Even if Baker is right that the habeas court’s decision was mistaken, what harm would 
have resulted from failing to appeal that decision?  All that would have happened is 
that amidst widespread rejoicing Genarlow Wilson would have left prison, and there 
would be left intact a court decision with little precedential value–an unreported, 
unappealed trial court judgment releasing the prisoner in a nationally known case 
involving a black youth incarcerated in a gross miscarriage of justice.  Nor would a 
discretionary decision by Baker not to appeal obligate him to forego other appeals or 
impair his ability to represent the state in other habeas proceedings. 
 
Instead of acting to correct a gross injustice, Thurbert Baker has aggravated it.  Why 
is Thurbert Baker behaving so badly?      
